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Abstract-Virtual
system (VeS)
(VCS) based routroutAbstract- Virtual coordinate system
ing provides a practical, efficient
efficient and scalable means
means for
for
point-to-point
wireless sensor networks.
networks. Several
Several
point-to-point routing in wireless
VCS-based routing
routing protocols
YeS-based
protocols have been proposed
proposed in the
assuming that nodes are cooperative.
cooperative.
last few years, all assuming
However, malicious
malicious nodes
nodes may violate this assumption,
assumption,
However,
making YeS-based
VCS-based routing
routing protocols
protocols vulnerable
vulnerable to nunumaking
attacks. Thus, it is critical to provide
provide security
merous attacks.
mechanisms for
for these protocols to ensure correct operations
operations
mechanisms
adversarial deployment
deployment environments.
environments.
in adversarial
VCS-based routing
In this work, we study the security of YeS-based
protocols. We identify
identify new attacks targeting the accuracy
accuracy
stability of virtual coordinates
coordinates that YeS-based
VCS-based routing
and stability
relies on and propose several defense
defense mechanisms
mechanisms against
relies
attacks. We evaluate
evaluate the impact of the attacks
attacks
the identified attacks.
mechanisms using a
and the effectiveness of our defense mechanisms
well-known YeS-based
VCS-based routing
routing protocol,
protocol, BVR.
well-known
I. INTRODUCTION

paper, we study the problem of securing vesVCSIn this paper,
VCSrouting protocols. Like other routing protocols, vesbased routing protocols are vulnerable to numerous attacks that seek to disturb the routing service by injecting,
modifying, replaying or dropping packets. In addition,
VCS-based routing protocols depend significantly on the
YeS-based
accuracy and stability of the virtual coordinates. Our
contributions are:
are:

.

VCS• We identify and analyze new attacks against vesbased routing protocols that target the virtual coordinates. We refer to the attacks as coordinate inflation, deflation,
jation,
dejation, oscillation, and pollution attacks.
We show that virtual coordinate accuracy can be
injution, dedesignificantly influenced by coordinate inflation,
significantly
flation and pollution attacks while virtual coordinate
jation
stability can be influenced by coordinate oscillation
attacks.
• We evaluate experimentally the impact of the attacks on the accuracy and stability of virtual coordinates and on the routing performance, using a wellknown yeS-based
[8]. Our
VCS-based routing protocol, BVR [8].
experiments show that coordinate deflation is the
inflation
most damaging attack, while coordinate inflation
creates the least damage.
• We propose defense mechanisms against virtual
coordinate attacks. Specifically,
Specifically, we use hop-byhop authentication and a novel wormhole detection
deflation. We intechnique to address coordinate deflation.
troduce a coordinate variance based parent selection mechanism to mitigate coordinate oscillation
attacks and a coordinate replication technique to
mitigate coordinate pollution attacks.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
defense and mitigation mechanisms through simulations using an implementation of the BVR protocol
in the TOSSIM [10]
[lo] simulator.

Wireless sensor network designs have evolved in re[l]
cent years, from primarily focusing on data collection [1]
to more sophisticated tasks such as data centric storage
[2], [3].
[3]. Likewise, the requirements for communication
[2],
protocols have also evolved, from the basic many-toone and one-to-many communications to more sophisticated point-to-point communications. Well-known wireless routing protocols such as AODV [4]
[4] and DSR [5]
[5]
are not appropriate solutions for sensor networks as they
do not scale well for large networks and have relatively
(VCS) based
high overhead. Virtual coordinate system (VeS)
routing protocols have been proposed to overcome these
limitations. In such protocols, routing is performed in
a greedy manner based on virtual (or logical) coordinates obtained through a virtual coordinate establishment mechanism integrated with the routing protocol
system. vesVCSor through an external virtual coordinate system.
based routing protocols require only local interactions
and minimal state information that does not grow with
the size of the network. As a result, such protocols have
increased scalability and reduced overhead.
follows. SecThe rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Although several YeS-based
VCS-based routing protocols have
been proposed in the last few years [6], [7],
I1 provides an overview of the main mechanisms
[7], [8],
[8], [9],
[9], there tion II
involved in the design of yeS-based
VCS-based routing protocols.
has been little work that investigates the security of such involved
protocols. As many applications for wireless sensor net- Section III
I11 presents attacks against the virtual coordiworks require deployment in adversarial environments, it nates. Section IV outlines several defense mechanisms.
is critical to provide security mechanisms to make these Section V demonstrates the impact of the attacks and the
protocols operate correctly in the presence of attackers. effectiveness of our defense mechanisms using the BVR

.

.

.

routing protocol. Section YI
VI overviews related work and
VII concludes our paper.
Section YII
II. OVERVIEW OF YCS-BASED ROUTING PROTOCOLS
In this section, we provide an overview of the common
VCS-based routing protocols.
design of YCS-based
YCS-based
VCS-based routing protocols are geographical routing
protocols that forward packets to the neighbor that is
closest to the destination. Instead of using physical
VCS-based routing protocols use virtual
coordinates, YCS-based
or logical coordinates obtained through an integrated
virtual coordinate establishment mechanism or a virtual
coordinate system external to the routing protocol. In
the following, we assume the virtual coordinate system
is integrated with the routing protocol.
Most YCS-based
VCS-based routing protocol designs share four
major components: (1)
(1) virtual coordinate establishment,
(2) destination node coordinate lookup, (3) greedy routing, and (4)
(4) a fall-back or complementary procedure.
Virtual coordinate establishment is achieved based on a
set of reference nodes that can be special infrastructure
[6], or regular sensor nodes [7],
nodes, such as landmarks [6],
[8].
[S]. The virtual coordinates are established based on the
connectivity graph of the network. A common approach
is for the reference nodes to periodically broadcast
coordinate messages in the network. The flooding
flooding of
these messages across
across the network builds the shortest
path trees rooted at each of the reference nodes among
all the nodes in the network. For convenience, the parent
of a node on the shortest path tree is referred to as the
parent of the node. The hop count from a reference node
accumulates on the packet as the packet is flooded across
the network. The network coordinates of a node are then
derived based on the hop counts to each of the reference
nodes.
In order to route a message to a destination the
source node must be able to lookup the coordinates
of the destination node. Many protocols use a set of
coordinate servers to maintain coordinates for the nodes
in the network. Nodes are mapped to a coordinate server
by using a hash function.
function. A node is responsible for
informing the coordinate server storing its coordinates
of any change. In general,
general, the number of changes is low
in static wireless sensor networks.
Once a node obtains the coordinates of the destination
node, YCS-based
VCS-based routing follows the geographic routing
paradigm, in which each node forwards the message to
the neighbor that is the closest to the destination under
specific distance metric.
some protocol specific
Finally, if the greedy routing reaches a node that is
closer to the destination than all of its neighbors (i.e.
a local minima), a protocol specific
specific fall-back procedure
is invoked.
invoked. For example, in the case of the protocol in
[S], the fall-back procedure re-directs the message to
[8],

the reference node (known as a beacon) closest to the
destination. When the message reaches that beacon node,
it is then flooded
flooded in the network. Typically,
Typically, the fall-back
procedure incurs much more overhead than the greedy
forwarding process.
Two properties of the virtual coordinate establishment
that influence the performance of YCS-based
VCS-based routing
protocols are accuracy and stability. Accuracy captures
the difference between the perceived coordinates of
the nodes and their actual coordinates, while stability
captures the frequency of coordinate changes. Inaccurate
coordinates may cause messages to be routed in a wrong
direction; unstable coordinates, on the other hand, can
cause route flapping
flapping and incur additional coordinate
maintenance overhead.
III. ATTACKS AGAINST YCS-BASED ROUTING
In this section we present several new attacks against
VCS-based routing protocols. The attacks are specific
specific
YCS-based
VCS-based routing protocols and exploit the fact
to YCS-based
that such protocols depend heavily on the accuracy
and stability of the virtual coordinates. After describing
the assumptions we make about adversaries, we outline
some general attacks against wireless sensor networks.
We then describe attacks against the virtual coordinate
establishment and the coordinate lookup component of
YCS-based
VCS-based routing protocols. Finally, we exemplify how
the newly identified virtual coordinate attacks can be
exploited to attack the greedy-routing protocol.
A. Adversarial Model

We assume that the radio links are insecure. The
attackers can eavesdrop on the radio transmissions, inject
packets, modify packets, and replay previously overheard
[l 11, that
packets. We assume "mote"
"mote" class attackers [11],
is, the attacker nodes are similar in capabilities as
is,
legitimate nodes. We also do not assume the legitimate
sensor nodes are tamper resistant. The attacker may
compromise some legitimate nodes and get full control
on the operations of the compromised nodes. She can
also extract all the secret keys and any other data in the
compromised nodes to share with other attacker nodes.
The attacker may also arrange multiple attacker nodes
to collude via high quality communication links and
establish wormholes.
The physical and MAC layers are susceptible to direct
attacks. The attacker can jam the network with high
power radio transmitters. She can also more stealthily
mount DoS attacks on the MAC by exploiting the specific vulnerabilities of the MAC protocol. The physical
layer DoS attacks are typically countered by frequency
hopping or spread spectrum techniques. The MAC layer
attacks can be addressed with more secure MAC pro[12]. While these attacks are real and
tocols, such as [12].

dangerous, we consider them out of the scope of the
dangerous,
paper.
focus on general attacks against sensor
We do not focus
[ 131, or node replication
networks, such as Sybil attacks [13],
attacks [14], in which a single adversary can control a
significant fraction of the network by claiming multiple
identities or cloning a subset of physical devices, re[IS] are
spectively. We assume that techniques such as [15]
spectively.
[14] to address
employed to address Sybil attacks and [14]
node replication attacks.

B. General Attacks on Wireless
Wireless Sensor Networks
Several basic attacks against sensor networks were
[ l l ] . Some of these attacks can be used in
outlined in [11].
identify. To facilitate
the virtual coordinate attacks we identify.
the presentation of the virtual coordinate attacks, we
summarize them here:
Spoojing, altering,
altering, or replaying packets: The attacker
Spoofing,
exploits the open nature of wireless communication and
spoof, alter,
alter, or replay control
the lack of authentication to spoof,
or data packets. Such attacks can usually be prevented
using authentication protocols and freshness mechanisms
such as timestamps, nonces, and sequence numbers.
Selective forwarding: The attacker does not correctly
provide the routing service by selectively dropping some
of the packets. This type of attack requires the attacker
to be an insider and cannot be addressed by means of
authentication.
Wormhole: One attacker node forwards the overheard
Wormhole:
messages via some out-of-band channel to another attacker node in a distant network region where the
messages are replayed. The wormhole attack generally causes confusion on the neighborhood relationship
among legitimate nodes, which usually damages normal
operations of the upper layer protocols. Previously proposed solutions to address this problem require tight
[17]
clock synchronization and topology information [17]
not necessarily available in sensor networks, specialized
hardware such as directional antennas [18], or are dede[19] not appropriate
MAC protocols [19]
signed for specific MAe
for sensor networks.
C. Virtual Coordinate Attacks
C.

YeS-based
VCS-based routing protocols rely significantly on the
accuracy and stability of the virtual coordinates. A
VCS-based routing protocols
class of attacks specific to YeS-based
target the virtual coordinate establishment and coordinate
lookup components, causing the resulting coordinates
Specifically, the
to be unusable to the routing protocol. Specifically,
attacker aims to cause legitimate nodes to have incorrect
coordinates, unstable coordinates, or both. Now we clascoordinates,
sify the attacks against virtual coordinates based on their
intended effect on the coordinate system established.

1 ) Coordinate Deflation Attack: The goal of this
1)
attack is to cause legitimate nodes to obtain network
coordinates smaller than their actual coordinates. One
way an attacker can mount this attack is by announcing
wayan
incorrect small coordinates in its neighborhood. The
attacker nodes can be either compromised legitimate
nodes or outside malicious nodes spoofing legitimate
nodes. Another way the attacker can mount this attack
is by using the wormhole attack. If one attacker node is
overlocated close to a reference node, it can tunnel the overheard legitimate announcements with small coordinates
to another attacker node in a distant network region. By
replaying these tunneled coordinate announcements, the
attacker can cause legitimate nodes in the distant region
to derive incorrect small coordinates.
2 ) Coordinate Inflation Attack: The goal of this attack
2)
is to cause legitimate nodes to obtain larger coordinates
than their actual coordinates. Similar to the coordinate
artificially
deflation attack, the attacker can announce artificially
enlarged coordinates by either compromising legitimate
nodes, spoofing legitimate nodes, or tunnelling and replaying legitimate announcements of large coordinates
from a distant network region.
Unlike the coordinate deflation attack, the coordinate
inflation attack is not always effective. If the legitimate
nodes have a path to the reference node that does not pass
through any attacker nodes, the legitimate nodes can still
derive correct network coordinates from the coordinate
However, if the
message forwarded on the correct path. However,
attacker nodes form a vertex-cut between the legitimate
nodes and the reference nodes, the incorrect large coordinate announcements from the attacker nodes directly
inflate the coordinates of these legitimate nodes. If the
protocol considers path quality when determining coordinates, the coordinate inflation attack can also be made
more effective by having the attacker nodes announce
quality.
large coordinates but with good path quality.
3)
Coordinate
Oscillation
Attack:
The goal of this
3)
Oscillation
attack is to cause instability of the virtual coordinates.
The attacker can mount this attack by alternatively
making announcements with small coordinates and large
coordinates or by making random coordinate announcements. As a result, the legitimate nodes near the attacker
node adjust their coordinates accordingly and oscillate
between large and small coordinates. Similar to the
coordinate inflation and deflation attacks, the fake coordinate announcements made by the attacker nodes can
either be from compromised nodes, spoofing nodes, or
be wormhole tunneled from other regions of the network.
4 ) Coordinate Pollution Attack: The operation of the
4)
VCS-based routing relies on the correct information of
YeS-based
inflation,
the destination coordinates. Unlike coordinate inflation,
deflation, or oscillation attacks which cause nodes to
deflation,
incorrectly compute their coordinates, the goal of a

coordinate pollution attack is to influence
influence the coordinate the attacker node, it can either behave as a gray-hole
selectively dropping routing traffic to mount more
lookup so that source nodes obtain incorrect coordinates by selectively
targeted attacks or behave as a black-hole by dropping
of the destination nodes they need to route to.
We discuss two approaches that the attacker can use all routing traffic.
We note that in the context of wireless sensor netto mount this attack. As described in Section II,
11, virtual
works, as nodes rely on other nodes to derive their
coordinate systems use coordinate servers to store the works,
virtual coordinates of all the nodes in the network and virtual coordinates, all of the virtual coordinate attacks
"contagious," in the sense that legitimate nodes once
to respond to coordinate queries
queries from possible source are "contagious,"
nodes looking up coordinates of destination nodes. If the affected by the attack become "attackers" themselves,
attacker can compromise one or more coordinate servers,
servers, and propagate the effect of the attack further in the
attack,
she can give arbitrary responses to the coordinate queries network. For example, for the coordinate deflation attack,
once the direct neighbors of the attacker node derive inadversarial controlled servers.
servers.
directed to adversarial
Alternatively,
Alternatively, the attacker can mount the attack in a correct small coordinates for themselves, they announce
way similar to the rushing attack [20].
[20]. If the attacker can these incorrect coordinates in their neighborhoods and
spoof the coordinate servers,
servers, she can directly forge re- cause their neighbors to have incorrect small coordinates
sponses
sponses to position queries and send the forged response as well. This infection process continues throughout the
to the victim node before the response from the actual whole network until the incorrect coordinate announcecoordinate server arrives.
arrives. If the victim node uses only ments reach the legitimate nodes that are closer to the
the first
first query response and ignores others, it will use actual reference node than to the attacker node. A backthe wrong destination coordinate information for all the of-envelope calculation reveals that a well positioned
attacker can result in as much as 80% of the nodes in
messages destined to the target node.
Similarly, the
The danger of the coordinate pollution attack lies in the network to have wrong coordinates. Similarly,
inflation attack and a coordinate
the fact that the affected messages are usually forwarded
forwarded effect of a coordinate inflation
futilely over many hops toward wrong or non-existent oscillation attack can be propagated throughout a large
positions in the network. Eventually,
Eventually, the messages
messages are portion of the network with a single well positioned
either dropped when the TTL expires or the expensive attacker node. Due to the potential network wide impact
fall-back mode is invoked on the message if the message that can be achieved by a small number of attackers,
reaches a local minimal before the TTL expires. There- these attacks are particularly dangerous.
fore, incorrect destination coordinates not only cause a
IV. MITIGATING
COORDINATE
ATTACKS
MITIGATING VIRTUAL
VIRTUAL COORDINATE
ATTACKS
significant
significant number of routing failures,
failures, but also incur
a significant amount of resource consumption in the
In this section, we describe the mechanisms to mit.
network.
igate the virtual coordinate attacks described in the
previous section.
section. We first
first describe our assumptions, then
D. Impact of
of Virtual
Virtual Coordinate
Coordinate Attacks
we focus on the defense against the attacks. Our goal
message routing in is to maintain accurate and stable virtual coordinates
An attacker can disrupt normal message
the network by directly disrupting the virtual coordinate and high routing performance with minimum overhead
attackers. To avoid blacklist
establishment and the node coordinate lookup process. despite the presence of attackers.
In addition, since the success of the greedy routing is attacks where a node spreads false rumors about other
the key to the low overhead of a typical VCS-based nodes, we adopt the principle that a node makes decision
routing protocol, the attacker can also indirectly impede only based on their own observations.
the correct functioning of the network by causing a
failures. The frequent A. Assumptions
large number of greedy routing failures.
fall-back
invocation of the expensive fallback mode in the routing
We assume broadcast authentication is available,
protocol causes an overwhelmingly high overhead in the which can be achieved by using existing techniques
performance.
network and degrades the routing performance.
[21]. We also assume the existence of
such as pTESLA
ttTESLA [21].
The vulnerabilities on the virtual coordinates may symmetric keys between any two nodes in the network,
also be exploited to magnify the attacker's power in which can be achieved by using a pre-distributed key
specific VCS-based routing protocol. For management scheme for sensor networks such as [22],
attacking some specific
[22],
example, in BVR, nodes prefer neighbors with small [23],
[25], [26].
[26]. This enables data source authenti[23], [24], [25],
forwarding. By cation, excluding the possibility of outsider attacks, such
coordinates as next hop for message forwarding.
using the coordinate deflation attack,
attack, the attacker node as message spoofing,
spoofing, altering, and injection.
artificially deflates
deflates the network coordinates in the region
artificially
We assume the existence of a secure neighbor verthus attracting a significant
significant portion of the routing traffic ification method that allows
allows each node to verify didiin the network.
network. Once the traffic is diverted through rect neighbor relationships. Since such a verification
verification

method is not invoked unless the presence of attacks is
positively detected,
detected, simple and inexpensive mechanisms
example, one may implement such
are sufficient. For example,
a verification method by measuring and comparing the
RTT to the claimed neighbor with the estimated one-hop
RTT. Finally, we assume that the network is static and
relatively stable, and that there is a period of time, such
as the initial period after the network deployment, when
the network is not under attack.
B. Mitigating Inflation and Deflation Attacks
An attacker mounts the inflation and deflation attacks by making malicious coordinate announcements or
by tunneling overheard legitimate coordinate announcements from one network region to another network region. Data source authentication prevents attacker nodes
from spoofing or injecting packets. However,
However, the correct
derivation of the coordinates of each node relies on other
nodes in the network correctly updating the coordinate
Thus,
messages as they are flooded across the network. Thus,
further mechanisms are necessary to prevent attacker
nodes from making malicious changes to the coordinate
messages. In the following, we first describe a hash chain
based technique that prevents attacks in the absence of
wormholes, then we address the wormhole based attacks.
Our techniques can be adapted to work for both
inflation and deflation attacks. However,
However, deploying the
protection mechanisms for both attacks will double the
overhead of the protocol. As noted in the previous
section and validated in the experiments (Section V-B),
the coordinate inflation attack has only limited impact in
focus on the
general network topologies. Thus, we only focus
coordinate deflation attack.
I) Preventing Deflation Attacks Based on Malicious
1)
Coordinate Message Updates:
Updates: Most VCS-based routing
protocols use a hop count and/or
andlor some hop count like
field (e.g. path quality) in the coordinate messages for
field
deriving network coordinates. In the following, we discuss a hash chain based technique similar to the one in
[27]
[27] for protecting the hop count field
field in detail. We note
that this method can be easily adapted to protect other
hop count like fields that are incremented at each hop.
field,
To use the hash chain to protect the hop count field,
the reference node first generates a random number rr
and uses a one-way hash function H to generate a hash
chain,
r,, H
H(r),
H(2)
T
( r ) ,H
( ~(r),
( r)) ,...
. . . ,,H(N)
~ ( ~(r),
) ( r ) ,
H(i)
H on r iteratively for
where ~
( ~(r)) denotes
( r ) applying H

ii times, and N is the estimated upper bound for the

network diameter. The reference node then uses authenticated broadcast to disseminate the tuple (H(N)
N),
( ~ ( ~(r),) (N
r) ,)
referred to as the anchor tuple,
tuple, throughout the network.
When broadcasting coordinate messages, instead of including the plain hop count, the reference node includes

(0, r),
T ) , referred to as the hop count tuple,
tuple, in the
the tuple (0,
message.
( i ,Vi)
vi) in the
When a node receives the hop count tuple (i,
coordinate message, it first
first verifies that H(N-i)
H ( * - ~ (v;)
) ( V ==
~)
H(N)
H ( N )(r).
( r ) . If the verification is successful, the node
determines its hop count as i + 11 and forwards the tuple
( i + 1,
1,H ((Vi))
v i ) ) to their neighbors.
(i
Note that with the above approach, it is impossible for
a node to claim a hop count that is smaller than its actual
hop count by more than one, unless they are able to invert
however, can
H . The attacker node, however,
the hash function H.
claim one less hop count by replaying the hop count
tuple it received from the previous hop. Such attacks
only result in a decrease of one in the coordinates of the
attacker node, and we expect them to have only limited
impact in affecting the coordinates of other nodes.
of Deflation Attacks Based on WormWorm2) Detection of
holes: Besides making malicious updates to the coordinate messages directly, wormholes present another
viable means for mounting the deflation attacks. We
now present a technique for detecting and eliminating
wormhole based deflation attacks.
Our wormhole detection algorithm relies on the observation that in the presence of the coordinate deflation
attack the hop count distribution of the nodes differs
significantly from the distribution in the case without
attacks. More specifically,
specifically, the coordinate deflation attack
causes more nodes to have small hop counts and fewer
nodes to have large hop counts. In a naive approach,
we can detect such changes,
changes, hence the presence of the
attack, by querying the coordinates of all the nodes in the
network. In the following,
following, we propose a more efficient
algorithm based on statistical sampling for detecting such
changes.
Our algorithm runs on a central entity (CE), which
can be a base station or a laptop that sweeps through
first
the network periodically. In the high level, the CE first
estimates the hop count distribution, referred to as the
reference distribution, for the case when the network is
known to be not under attack (e.g. immediately after the
network deployment). Then the CE periodically compares the estimate of the current hop count distribution
with the estimated reference distribution using Pearson's
x2-test [28]
X2-test
[28] to determine if a change in the distribution
has occurred. Now we describe the details of the method.
Characterizing the hop count distribution
distribution To efficiently
ficiently estimate the hop count distribution, the CE
performs simple random sampling (SRS) on the network
by uniformly randomly selecting m
m nodes with replacement. Then the CE queries the sampled nodes for their
(nl, np),
nl is the number
n2), where nl
, coordinates and records (nl'
of nodes with hop count less than or equal to a hop count
n2
p is the number of nodes with hop
threshold k and n
count greater than kk.. The hop count threshold k is an

+

+

input to
to the algorithm. Optimally,
Optimally, k is selected such that
in
in the
the presence of the attack, there are more nodes for all
the
the hop
hop counts less
less than or equal k and fewer nodes for
all
the
hop
counts
greater than k.
k. The optimal value for
all the
kk maximizes the changes in nl
n l and n2 before and after
the
the attack,
attack, thus
thus maximizing the probability of detecting
the
the changes.
changes. Typically,
Typically, half of the network diameter is a
good estimation for
k. Note that since we sample with
for k.
replacement, the unique number of nodes in the sample
isis most likely
likely smaller than the sample
sample size.
size.'I
Statistical
Statistical change
change detection
detection Let (rl'
( r l,r2)
r 2 ) and (81,
( s l , 82)
s2)
be the
the numbers that the CE recorded in the time assumed
with no
no attacks and
and in some
some other time for which we
wish to
to check for
for the presence of attacks. We now
perform the Pearson's x2-test
X2-testas
as follows.
follows.
Let E
El1 =
= ~(rl
i ( r l + 81),
sl), E
E2
= ~(r2
i2 ( r 2 + 82),
s 2 ) ,and
2=

+

+

x2

="
(rj-E j ?+(8j-Ej ?
L
E·
'
j=I,2

J

then assuming
assuming the network is not under attack,
attack, we have
X
X 22 follows
follows the X22 distribution with I1 degree of freedom,
2
> X 22)) can be obtained with
and
Pr(X2
and the
the P-value pp == Pr(x
the
the standard
standard statistical software.
software. Let f (e.g. 0.05)
0.05) be the
acceptable false
false positive rate, we declare that the network
< f.
f.
is under attack if pp <
is
Note that the above method assumes
assumes the hop count
is static.
static. To account for
distribution in the network is
varations, we can adjust (rI'
( T I , r2)
7-2) by
normal network varations,
a small
small amount 06 and perform the above test only if
sl >
> rl + O.6 . The
The value of 06 depends on the expected
81
variations and is empirically estimated.
network variations
Once a wormhole deflation
deflation attack is detected,
detected, the CE
Once
floods the network with a wormhole warning message.
floods
Upon receiving the
the warning
warning message,
message, each node perDpon
forms neighbor verification
verification on their parent node. If
If the
forms
verification fails,
fails, it regards the node as an attacker and
verification
its coordinates based on its other neighbors.
re-calculates its

+

C. Mitigating
Mitigating Coordinate
Coordinate Oscillation
Oscillation Attack
C.

the coordinate oscillation attack,
attack, honest nodes upIn the
date their
their coordinates frequently due to the rapid changes
date
in the
the coordinate announcements made by their parent
in
node, which
which can be an attacker node or some other
node,
affected by the attack.
attack. To mitigate this
honest node affected
attack, we
we propose a stability
stability based parent selection
attack,
policy, under which more stable neighbors are preferred
policy,
as the
the parent.
parent. We now present the details as follows.
follows.
as
To
determine
the
stability
of
its
neighbors,
each node
To
its
stores the last tt coordinate announcements from each of
stores
its neighbors.
neighbors. The
The node then calculates the coordinate
its
for each of the neighbors as follows.
follows. Let
variance for
he expected value for
for the unique number of nodes in a sample of
lThe
m from
from a total
total of nn nodes
nodes isis n(1
n ( l -- (I
( 1 -- I/n)m)
l/n)m)
size m
size

(CI'
of the coordinate components of
of
( c l ,C2,
c2, ...
. . . ,,Ct)
ct) be one of
the last t coordinate announcements from neighbor
neighbor n,
n,
then the coordinate variance for the neighbor n with
respect to the coordinate component is
1
Sn = t _ 1

t

L

(Ci - fLn? ,

i=I

t

fLn =
= $x
2:~=1
Ci· A node rejects a neighbor
neighbor as
i = , ci.
where pn
its parent if its coordinate variance for any coordinate
component is larger than a threshold. The value for the
considering normal
threshold is empirically estimated by considering
network variations.
Although initially the attacker node can cause close
honest nodes to vary their coordinates rapidly and also
appear as attacker nodes to other nodes, after t coordinate
announcements are collected from the attacker node, all
of its honest neighbors will reject to use the ,attacker
.attacker
node as their parent due to the large variance computed
for the attacker node. Thus, the attacker node is quickly
isolated by its neighbors and the network re-stablizes.
parent selection
As a side benefit, this stability based parent
policy may also result in more stable coordinate system
for networks not under attack.
We note that a smarter attacker node may overcome
this defense mechanism by varying its coordinate announcements in a smaller range or less frequently so that
iliat
its computed variance is below the threshold. However,
of such an attack is significantly smaller than
the impact of
the full scale oscillation attacks.

D. Mitigating Coordinate Pollution Attack
Attack
In a coordinate pollution attack, source nodes obtain
incorrect virtual coordinates for destination nodes. Since
the authentication mechanisms described in Section IVA prevent spoofed replies to coordinate queries, the
main threat for coordinate pollution attacks comes from
compromised coordinate servers. We propose to mitigate
such threats by using redundant coordinate servers. More
specifically, each node stores its coordinates in multiple
specifically,
of in only one coordinate
coordinate servers, instead of
server. When querying the coordinates for a target node,
server.
the node sends the query to a random coordinate server
from all of the coordinate servers for the target node.
If the coordinates obtained from the selected coordinate
server result in poor routing performance,
performance, the node
of the coordinate servers for the target node.
queries all of
Then through a majority voting scheme, the node determines which coordinate servers are malicious and
refrains from using those servers for future queries.
We note that if the attacker compromised a majority
of the coordinate servers maintaining the coordinates
coordinates for
guaranteeing
some node, then there is no solution [29] to guaranteeing
that coordinate lookups for that node will return correct
results.

V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the impact of the attacks and the effectiveness of our proposed defense and
mitigation mechanisms using an implementation of the
[8] in
VCS-based routing protocol, BVR [8]
well-known YeS-based
[lo] simulator for sensor networks. We
the TOSSIM [10]
selected BVR because it is a mature protocol which was
shown to perform well in non-adversarial environments.
In BVR, the reference nodes and coordinate messages
used to compute coordinates are referred to as beacons
respectively. The beacons also
and beacon messages, respectively.
serve as coordinate servers. The coordinates in BVR
are described as a vector of hop-counts to each beacon.
Below we will use this terminology to describe the
experiments and discuss the results.

A. Experiment Setup and Metrics

100 nodes uniformly ranThe network consists of 100
domly distributed. The radio links are generated with
the LossyBuilder
LossyBuilder tool included in TOSSIM,
TOSSIM, which
generates probabilistic links based on empirical measurements from real motes. The average node degree is
surements
12. We randomly select 8 nodes to be beacons, each
12.
floods a beacon message every 10
10 seconds.
of which floods
For evaluating the routing performance, we make a
routing request between two randomly selected nodes
every second. For evaluating the impact of the attacks,
the attackers are randomly selected among the nodes and
all attackers drop all data packets passing through them.
seconds. The
The duration of each experiment is 2000 seconds.
10 different runs
experiment results are the average of 10
with different random topologies.
We seek to evaluate the accuracy and stability of the
virtual coordinates and their effect on the routing service.
We use n to denote the total number of nodes, m to
denote the number of beacons, i.e. the dimensions of
coordinates. The correct coordinates of node i are
the coordinates.
c', =
= (Ci1,Ci2,
(cil,cia,....
. . ,Cim),
,cim), while the perceived
denoted as ci
coordinates (due to attacks) of node i are denoted as
6
( x i l ,xi2,....
. . ,Xim).
,xim).
xi == (Xi1,Xi2,
coordinate accuracy:
accuracy: We characterize virtual
Virtual coordinate
coordinate accuracy by using the absolute errors in the
coordinates for individual nodes and for the system as
jth component of
a whole. We define the error of the jth
eij, as eij
eij =
= IXij
lxij -- Cij
cij I,1, and the
node i's coordinates, eij,
ei =
= 2::;:1 eij.
eij. We
error of the coordinates of node i as ei
use mean absolute error (MAE) to characterize systemwide errors. The system-wide error of the jth coordinate
Ejj =
= ~ xy=l
eij, and the
2::~=1 eij,
component E jj is defined as E
= 2::;:1 E jj ..
system-wide error E is defined as E =
coordinate stability: We characterize virtual
Virtual coordinate
coordinate stability by using the variance of the coordinates for individual nodes and for the system as a whole.
We sample the coordinates of all nodes in the network

xGl

xcl

periodically. Let T
T be the total number of samples taken
periodically.
= (x~1'
(x:,, x:,,
. . . ,,x~m)
xi,) be the coordinates of
and xit =
xb ...
node i at the tth sample. We define the instability value
sij as
of the jth component of node i's coordinates Sij
_
1 ",T (t
-)2
h
1 ",T
t
Sij
Xij =
Xij'
s 2.J. -- T-I
L
T - lE L.,t=1
Tt=l (Xij
x : -~ xXij; ~ , )were
where
~ , x;j
=T
$ L.,t=1 xi
The instability value for the coordinates of node i is
si =
= 2::;:1 Sij'
sij. The system-wide instability
defined as Si
S j is defined as
value for the jth
jth coordinate component Sj
Sj
2::~=1 Sij
Sj =
= ~ xy=l
sij and the system-wide instability value
S is defined as SS =
= 2::;:1 Sj.
Sj.
S
Routing performance:
Routing
performance: We characterize routing performance by using the routing success ratio which is
defined as the ratio between the number of successful
route requests and the number of route requests issued.
Since the performance of YeS-based
VCS-based routing protocols
relies on the success of greedy forwarding for the majority route requests, we consider only the greedy routing
success in the route success ratio.
ratio. We also examine the
cost of the protocol by measuring the total network traffic
required to route a packet.

ct

x;,

xEn=,

B. Coordinate
Coordinate Injlation
Inflation and Dejlation
Deflation Attacks

In these experiments, we consider that inflation and
deflation attacks are performed by the attacker nodes
en-route, by increasing or decreasing the hop-counts
en-route,
carried in the beacon packets. The beacons are assumed
to behave correctly. For the coordinate deflation attack,
we experiment with the case where the falsely claimed
1, referred to as Deflation(O)
Deflation(0) and
hop count is 0 and I,
Deflation(1). For the inflation attack we experiment with
Deflation(l).
the case where the falsely claimed hop count is 20
Deflation(0) and Inflation(20)
referred to as Inflation(20). Deflation(O)
correspond to the strongest deflation and inflation
inflation attacks. We consider two scenarios:
• Single beacon: This scenario investigates the impact
of the attacks for one coordinate component. The coordinates modified are issued by one beacon. We vary
the number of adversaries from
from I to 5,
5, but we include
only the results for the case of 5 adversaries due to their
similar trend.
• Full-scale: This scenario investigates
investigates the impact of the
attacks for all coordinate components. The coordinates
modified are issued by all the beacons, the number of
attackers varies from I1 to 20.
l(a) shows the eDF
CDF of the error of the affected coFig I(a)
ordinate component (eil) in the single beacon scenario.
As it can be seen in the strongest attack, Deflation(O),
Deflation(O),
about 70% of the nodes have an error greater than I1 hop
and about 50% of the nodes have an error greater than
l(c) show the system coordinate
2 hops. Fig I(b) and I(c)
respectively, in the
error E and the routing success ratio, respectively,
full-scale scenario. The figures
figures show that Deflation(O)
Deflation(0)
has the most severe impact on both the accuracy of the
virtual coordinates and the routing success ratio. A mere
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2 attacker nodes can bring the route success ratio from
around 90% to only 40%. In contrast, the coordinate
inflation attack has virtually no impact on either of these
metrics. In addition, the full-scale scenario shows that
the impact of the attack increases more slowly when
the number of attackers goes beyond 5. This is because
the network is almost fully disturbed with 5 attackers.
Increasing the number of attackers further causes only
limited additional damages.
The authentication techniques presented in Section IVB.l prevent the inflation and deflation attacks in the absence of wonnholes.
wormholes. In the next section, we evaluate the
effectiveness of our algorithm as described in Section IVwormhole based attacks.
B.2 for detecting wonnhole
C. Wonnhole-based
Wormhole-based Coordinate Deflation Detection
C.

wormholes used in defladeflaWe focus on the detection of wonnholes
tion attacks, because deflation attacks are the most severe
attacks and authentication cannot prevent a wonnholewormholebased coordinate deflation. As in the previous section, we
consider the case when the falsely advertised coordinates
1, and refer to the attacks as Deflation(O)
Deflation(0) and
are 0 and I,
Deflation(1).
Deflation(1
).
We demonstrate the effectiveness
effectiveness of our detection
mechanisms in two scenarios. The first scenario uses
the TOSSIM environment with a setup of 500 nodes
and the average node degree of 20. The second scenario
investigates the scalability of our scheme, in a simulator
for ideal unit disk networks with 3000 nodes randomly
distributed in a square area and the average node degree
12. As our wormhole based deflation attack relies on
of 12.

statistical sampling, the increased network size allows
us to show the effect of different sample sizes. In both
cases we assign five
five randomly selected nodes as wonnwormhole attackers which replay coordinate announcements
wonnhole
wormhole tunneled from another attacker node located
at one hop (in Deflation(O))
I))
Deflation(0)) and two hop (in Deflation(
Deflation(1))
distance from a beacon node. We measure the detection
rate and the false positive rate by averaging 50 different
random network topologies.

false
Fig 2(a) shows both the detection rate and the false
positive rate of the detection algorithm in the TOSSIM
environment. Fig 2(b) shows the number of unique
nodes queried for different sample sizes. As it can be
seen from these figures,
figures, with a sample size of 300
(about 226 unique nodes in the sample),
sample), our detection
algorithm achieves almost 100% detection rate. The
theoretical false positive rate for the algorithm is 0.05,
However, we see a
the selected detection cutoff P-value. However,
slight increase in the false positive rate as the sample size
increases. This is because with larger sample sizes the
detection algorithm becomes more sensitive to nonnal
normal
variations in the network. This anomaly can be countered
by taking into account the nonnal
normal network variation in
the detection algorithm.
Fig 2(c) shows the result for the 3000 nodes case in
simulator. The figure shows that the detection
the ideal simulator.
100 and the
rate is almost I1 for even a sample size of 100
0.
false positive rate is close to O.
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D. Coordinate
Coordinate Oscillation
Oscillation Attack and Defense

selected to
to be the
the source
source node,
node, and
and issues
issues route
route requests
requests
selected
to
randomly
selected
nodes,
once
second,
to
other
randomly
selected
nodes,
once
per
second,
after
We demonstrate
demonstrate the
the impact of the
the coordinate
coordinate oscillaoscillathe
initial
600
second
warm-up
period.
the
initial
600
second
warm-up
period.
tion
tion attack and
and the
the effectiveness
effectiveness of our proposed defense
defense
Fig 4(a) and
and 4(b)
4(b) show
show the
the route success
success ratio
ratio and
and the
the
with
with the
the single beacon and
and the
the full-scale
full-scale scenarios
scenarios as
as
total
network
traffic
over
time
averaged
in
100
second
total
network
traffic
over
time
averaged
in
100
second
described in Section
Section V-B.
V-B. We
We consider two
two types
types of
window for
for the
the coordinate
coordinate pollution attack
attack with and
and
oscillation attacks,
attacks, the
the alternate oscillation attack
attack where
where window
without
the
defense
mechanism.
As
seen
in
these
figures,
As
seen
in
these
figures,
without
the
defense
mechanism.
the
the attackers
attackers alternatively
alternatively make
make the
the coordinate announceannouncethe coordinate
coordinate pollution
pollution attack
attack not only
only decreases
decreases the
the
ment of 0 and
and 20
20 and the
the random
random oscillation
oscillation attack
attack the
bandsuccess
ratio,
also
increases
the
total
route
success
ratio,
but
also
increases
the
total
bandwhere the attackers
attackers make
make coordinate announcements
announcements
consumption significantly.
significantly. It
It takes
takes only
only about
about 100
100
uniformly randomly between 0 and
and 20.
20. We
We refer
refer to
to width consumption
seconds
for
defense
mechanism
to
isolate
malicious
seconds
for
our
defense
mechanism
to
isolate
malicious
these two
two attacks
attacks as
as Alternate
Alternate and
and Random,
Random, respectively.
respectively.
nodes and
and to
to return
return both metrics
metrics to
to a level
level similar
similar
The
The interval between two announcements
announcements isis uniformly beacon nodes
to
the
no
attack
case.
The
slight
discrepancy
in
the
route
to
the
no
attack
case.
The
slight
discrepancy
in
the
route
randomly
randomly between
between 00 and
and 20
20 seconds.
seconds. We
We record
record the
the
success
ratio
between
the
no
attack
case
and
the
attack
success
ratio
between
the
no
attack
case
and
the
attack
coordinates
coordinates of
of all
all the
the nodes
nodes every
every 100
100 seconds,
seconds, after
after the
the
with our
our defense
defense mechanism
mechanism case
case isis due
due to
to the
the smaller
smaller
initial
initial 600
600 seconds
seconds warm-up
warm-up to
to discount
discount the
the instability
instability with
of
honest
beacons,
which
have
a
more
important
of
honest
beacons,
which
have
a
more
important
number
due
due to
to system
system initialization.
initialization.
role in
in packet
packet routing
routing than
than regular nodes
nodes in
in BVR.
BVR.
role
Fig
Fig 3(a)
3(a) shows
shows the
the impact
impact of
of the
the Alternate
Alternate and
and RanRandom
dom attacks
attacks on
on the
the stability
stability of
of the
the affected
affected coordinate
coordinate
VI.
WORK
WORK
VI. RELATED
RELATED
component with and
and without our
Our defense
defense mechanism in
in
Recent work
work on
on the
the security
securityof
of sensor
sensor networks
networks mainly
mainly
Recent
the
the single
sing1e beacon scenario. Fig
Fig 3(b)
3(b) and
and 3(c)
3(c) show
show the
the focused
focused on
on proposing key
key management
management schemes
schemes that
that can
can
impact
and Random
Random attacks
attacks on
On the
the whole be
impactof
of the
the Alternate and
be used
used to
to bootstrap
bootstrap other services
services [22],
[22], [23],
[23], [24],
[24], [25],
[25],
coordinate
coordinate system
system and
and on
on the
the routing
routing success
success ratio
ratio with
with [26],
[26], addressing
addressing general
general attacks
attacks such
such as
as Sybil
Sybil [15]
[151 and
and
and
and without
without our
our defense
defense mechanism.
mechanism. As
As seen
seen in
in these
these replication
replication [14]
[141 attacks,
attacks, and
and identifying
identifying basic
basic attacks
attacks in
in
figures,
figures, both the
the alternate
alternate and
and random oscillation
oscillation attacks
attacks wireless
wireless sensor
sensor networks
networks [11].
can
can cause
cause significant
significant instability
instability to
to the
the node
node coordinates
coordinates
The problem of
of security
security in
in YeS-based
VCS-based routing
routing protoprotoThe
and
and degrade
degrade the
the routing
routing success
success ratio significantly, and
and cols
cols has
has not
not been
been studied
studied to
to the
the best of
of our
our knowledge.
knowledge.
the
the Alternate attack
attack has
has aa more
more severe
severe impact
impact than
than the
the Previous
Previous work in
in this
this area
area focused
focused on
on improving
improving acacRandom attack.
attack. Our
Our defense
defense mechanism
mechanism successfully
successfully curacy
Random
curacy of
of the
the virtual
virtual coordinates
coordinates and
and the
the performance
perfomance
mitigates
mitigates both types
types of
of attacks,
attacks, with
with the
the system
system stability
stability of routing
routing under
under non-malicious
non-malicious environments
environments [9]
[g] and
and
restored to the
the normal
noma1 level
level and
and the
the route success
success ratio proposing fault-tolerant
fault-tolerant techniques
techniques for
for ves
VCS [6]
[6] or
or for
for
degrading
degrading gracefully
gracefully with
with the
the number of
of attackers.
attackers.
the
the BVR
BVR routing
routing protocol
protocol [30].
[30].
The
The security
security of
of geographical
geographical routing
routing protocols
protocols using
using
E.
E. Coordinate
Coordinate Pollution
Pollution Attack and Defense
physical
[31] for
for sensor
sensor netnetphysical positions
positions was
was studied
studied in
in [31]
In
In these
these experiments,
experiments, all
all the
the eight
eight beacon
beacon nodes
nodes also
also works
[32], [33]
[33] for
for ad
ad hoc
hoc networks.
networks. Most
Most of
of the
the
works and
and in
in [32],
work focuses
focuses on
on preventing
preventing malicious
malicious modifications
modifications of
of
act
act as
as the
the coordinate
coordinate servers.
servers. We
We randomly
randomly select
select three
three work
of
the destination
destination location
location information
information in
in packets,
packets, verifying
verifying
of the
the coordinate
coordinate servers
servers to
to be
be malicious.
malicious. When
When the
the the
neighbor location
location information,
information, and
and preventing
preventing message
message
defense
defense mechanism
mechanism isis deployed,
deployed, each
each node
node stores
stores its
its neighbor
droppings. Another
Another main
main area
area of
of work
work in
in securing
securing geogeocoordinates
coordinates in
in three
three random
random servers
servers based
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on the
the hash
hash of
of droppings.
its
graphic routing
routing isis the
the protection
protection of
of the
the position
position service
service
A node
node invokes
invokes the
the majority
majority voting
voting mechanism
mechanism to
to graphic
its ID.
ID. A
[34], [33].
[33]. Securing
Securing vesVCSin the
the system,
system, which
which includes
includes [34],
determine
determine if
if aa coordinate
coordinate server
server isis malicious
malicious if
if the
the route
route in
based routing
routing protocols
protocols involves
involves the
the unique
unique challenges
challenges
success
success ratio
ratio using
using the
the coordinates
coordinates from
from the
the server
server falls
falls based
of securing
securing the
the coordinate
coordinate establishment
establishment itself,
itself, which
which
below
below 0.5.
0.5. The
The traffic
traffic scenario
scenario isis that
that aa node
node isis randomly
randomly of
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Impact of the coordinate pollution attack with and without defense

is absent in the physical position based geographic
routings. Thus, a new set of measures are required.
VII. CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
In this work we focused on a new class of attacks
against yeS-based
VCS-based routing protocols for sensor networks. The attacks exploit the reliance of such protocols
on the accuracy and stability of virtual coordinates. We
classified these attacks as coordinate inflation,
inflation, deflation,
deflation,
oscillation, and pollution attacks. We proposed several
defense and mitigation techniques addressing each of
these attacks. We demonstrated the impact of the attacks
and the effectiveness of our mitigation techniques using
a well-known YeS-based
VCS-based routing protocol, BVR, and
the TOSSIM simulator.
simulator. Our future
future work includes further
analyzing the identified attacks and evaluating their
impact on other applications of Yes.
VCS.
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